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Abstract
Moral psychologists have recently turned their attention to the study of folk metaethi-
cal beliefs. We report the results of a cross-cultural study using Chinese, Polish and 
Ecuadorian participants that seeks to advance this line of investigation. Individuals in 
all three demographic groups were observed to attribute objectivity to ethical state-
ments in very similar patterns. Differences in participants’ strength of opinion about an 
issue, the level of societal agreement or disagreement about an issue, and participants’ 
age were found to significantly affect their inclination to view the truth of an ethical 
statement as a matter of objective fact. Implications for theorizing about folk morality 
are discussed.
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1 Introduction
One of the most exciting areas of current research in moral psychology is the 
study of folk metaethical commitments (Goodwin and Darley, 2008; Sarkissian 
et al., 2011; Beebe and Sackris, data not shown; Wright et al., 2013). In contrast 
to what philosophers call ‘normative ethical questions’ about what it is that 
makes certain actions morally right or wrong, metaethical questions concern 
questions like the distinction between moral norms and social conventions, 
the possible variation in what morality requires from culture to culture or per-
son to person, and the objectivity and truth conditions of moral judgments.
The impetus for much of the latest research on the relativist or objectivist 
views of ordinary individuals is a paper by Geoffrey Goodwin and John Darley 
(2008), in which they report that American undergraduates tend to regard 
moral judgments as more objective than statements of social conventions or 
preferences and almost as objective as statements of scientific fact. They also 
observed considerable variation across individuals and across different ethical 
issues. In a subsequent study, James Beebe and David Sackris (data not shown) 
found that American undergraduates attributed significantly less objectivity to 
moral judgments than did younger or older individuals from the same region 
of the United States. Hagop Sarkissian, John Park, David Tien, Jennifer Cole 
Wright, and Joshua Knobe (2011) reported that metaethical judgments tend to 
vary as a function of cultural distance, with increased distance (i.e., decreasing 
cultural similarity) leading to decreased attributions of metaethical objectiv-
ity. Jennifer Cole Wright, Piper Grandjean, and Cullen McWhite (2013) found 
that in addition to there being significant diversity among individuals with 
regard to the objectivity they attribute to moral judgments, there is also signifi-
cant diversity of opinion with respect to whether certain issues are viewed as 
moral issues at all.
Together, these findings appear to undermine the traditional view among 
philosophers that ordinary people view moral judgments as uniformly and 
fully objective – i.e., as being as mind-independently true or false as the most 
uncontroversial scientific statements (cf., Mackie, 1977; Brink, 1989; Smith, 1994; 
Darwall, 1998 for statements of this view). While it will come as no surprise to 
social scientists that a sweeping claim like this (made without any attempt 
to ground it in scientific evidence) should turn out to be false, it nevertheless 
counts as news within the halls of professional philosophy.
With only two exceptions, all of the participants in the studies mentioned 
above have been American undergraduates. In one of their studies, Sarkissian 
et al. (2011) recruited undergraduates from Singapore, in order to show that 
the results they obtained with American students generalized to at least one 
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other participant population. In addition, Beebe and Sackris (data not shown) 
recruited more than two thousand participants between the ages of 12 and 88 
who were not college students. However, all of their participants either resided 
in western New York or had a connection to a large, public university located 
there. This means that the participant populations that have been studied so 
far have been rather limited in scope.
In an effort to extend the empirical investigation of folk metaethical commit-
ments to a wider and more culturally diverse class of individuals, we deployed 
research materials analogous to those used by Beebe and Sackris (data not 
shown) in China, Poland, and Ecuador. We found many of the same basic pat-
terns of responses observed by Beebe and Sackris. In Section 2, we describe the 
methods and key results of Beebe and Sackris and specify more precisely what 
we expected to observe in our participant populations. In Section 3, we report 
the results of our cross-cultural study. Finally, in Section 4, we briefly discuss 
the most important lessons or implications of our findings.
2 Moral Objectivism across the (American) Lifespan
Drawing inspiration from Goodwin and Darley (2008), Beebe and Sackris 
(data not shown) constructed the following list of statements about matters 
of physical fact, morality, and taste – including a roughly equal proportion of 
controversial and uncontroversial statements within each domain. Statements 
such as (2) and (7) – about global warming and the age of the Earth – are con-
troversial within the United States, whereas statements (6) and (8) – about 
the smallest planet and the relative location of two well-known American 
cities – are not. Similarly, euthanasia (10) and abortion (12) are controversial 
within the U.S., but robbery (16) and assault (17) are uncontroversially seen as 
bad. Beebe and Sackris suspected that participants would also naturally distin-
guish between statements of taste that were controversial and those that were 
uncontroversial. For example, they hypothesized that statements comparing 
the musical merits of Beethoven and Britney Spears (23) and the attractiveness 
of two American celebrities whose handsomeness ratings were very far apart 
(21) would be viewed as significantly less controversial than other taste claims.
Beebe and Sackris (data not shown) directed participants to complete three 
tasks with respect to the statements in Figure 1. In Task 1, participants indi-
cated the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement on a 
six-point scale from ‘1’ (‘Strongly Disagree’) to ‘6’ (‘Strongly Agree’). In Task 2, 
participants were asked the following question:
 389moral objectivism in cross-cultural perspective
Journal of Cognition and Culture 15 (��15) 386–401
If someone disagrees with you about whether (one of the test statements is 
true), is it possible for both of you to be correct or must one of you be mistaken?
(A) It is possible for both of you to be correct.
(B) At least one of you must be mistaken.
Beebe and Sackris interpreted (B) as an ascription of objectivity to the state-
ment in question and (A) as a denial of objectivity. While there are likely to be 
multiple dimensions or kinds of objectivity that can be attributed to a moral 
statement, the Task 2 question seems to capture one of the most important 
dimensions. If some version of subjectivism is true, according to which one’s 
beliefs, decisions, preferences, or other mental states make moral statements 
true or false, it may be impossible to be mistaken about them. Alternatively, if 
some version of emotivism is true (e.g., Ayer 1936, Stevenson 1946), and moral 
statements have no genuine truth conditions, two disagreeing parties would 
again be shielded from the possibility of being mistaken. Task 2 attempts to 
measure whether individuals take moral statements to have mind-indepen-
dent truth conditions. In Task 3, Beebe and Sackris directed participants to 
indicate the extent to which they thought that “people in our (i.e., American) 
society” disagreed about the statements in question. Participants registered 
their opinions on a six-point scale that ranged from ‘There is no disagreement 
at all’ to ‘There is an extremely large amount of disagreement.’
FIGURE 1 Proportions of participant objectivity 
attributions to the factual, ethical, and taste 
statements that appear in Table 1. Error bars in 
all figures represent 95% confidence intervals.
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The proportions of objectivist responses that Beebe and Sackris observed in 
their study are represented in Figure 1.
The average proportion of objectivity attributions was 0.60 for factual claims, 
0.47 for ethical claims, and 0.15 for taste claims. The difference in the propor-
tions of objectivity attributions to factual and ethical statements constituted 
a small effect size (Cramér’s V = 0.12), while the difference between objectiv-
ity attributions to ethical and taste claims represented a medium effect size 
(Cramér’s V = 0.33). Most philosophers would have predicted significantly 
higher objectivity attributions for both factual and ethical claims. As can 
be seen in Figure 1, there was also significant variation in the proportion of 
objectivity responses within each subcategory, with some ethical claims being 
treated as more objective than some factual claims, and some taste claims 
treated as more objective than some ethical claims. Participants on the whole 
had stronger opinions about ethical statements than about factual ones (when 
Beebe and Sackris recoded all (strong) ‘1’ and ‘6’ responses on Task 1 as ‘3,’ all 
(moderate) ‘2’ and ‘5’ responses as ‘2,’ and (weak) ‘3’ and ‘4’ responses as ‘1,’ the 
mean strength of opinion rating was 2.20 for factual statements, 2.45 for ethical 
statements, and 2.22 for taste claims. The greater strength of belief in regard 
to ethical statements represented a small effect size (Cramér’s V = 0.10).) and 
perceived greater disagreement about ethical claims (3.58) than factual (3.29) 
or taste (3.31) claims (this represents a small effect size (Cramér’s V = 0.12)). 
Beebe and Sackris also found that, while participants’ attributions of objec-
tivity were positively correlated with the strength of their opinions (factual: 
rpb = 0.26; ethical: rpb = 0.41; taste: rpb = 0.24) and negatively correlated with 
the extent to which they thought there was disagreement within society about 
the issue (factual: rpb = -0.17; ethical: rpb = -0.26; taste: rpb = -0.13), participants 
showed an ability to distinguish the issues of strength of agreement, perceived 
disagreement, and objectivity.
The most significant result obtained by Beebe and Sackris concerns the 
association between participants’ age and their inclination to attribute objec-
tivity to ethical statements. The average proportion of objectivity attributions 
in the 17 to 29 year old participant group (0.37) was significantly lower than the 
averages in the 12 to 16 (0.47), 30 to 51 (0.56), or 52 to 88 (0.48) groups (17 – 29 
vs. 12 – 16: χ2 (1, N = 1849) = 19.431, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.10 (small effect size). 
17 – 29 vs. 30 – 51: χ2 (1, N = 1962) = 68.974, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.19 (small 
effect size). 17 – 29 vs. 52 – 88: χ2 (1, N = 6921) = 46.235, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 
0.08 (small effect size)). The best explanation for these differences seems to be 
that it is during their late teens and early twenties that individuals are most 
open to new experiences and most actively engaged in self-exploration and 
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identity-formation and that this psychic fluidity and openness leads them to 
be receptive to the possibility of there being more than one correct moral sys-
tem (McCrae & Costa, 2003; Srivastava, John, Gosling & Potter, 2003).
In our study, we wanted to investigate the extent to which similar results 
might be obtained in different cultural settings. We formulated the following 
hypotheses about what we would observe:
(H1) Individuals in China, Poland, and Ecuador would attribute more objec-
tivity to factual claims than to ethical claims and more objectivity to ethi-
cal claims than to taste claims.
(H2) Within each participant group, the average amount of objectivity attrib-
uted to ethical statements would fall far below the level predicted by tra-
ditional philosophical theories.
(H3) Within each participant group, there would be considerable variation in 
individuals’ willingness to attribute objectivity to ethical statements.
(H4) Within each participant group, some ethical claims would be treated as 
more objective than some factual claims, and some taste claims treated 
as more objective than some ethical claims.
(H5) For each statement type, the attributions of objectivity within each par-
ticipant group would be positively associated with participants’ strength 
of opinion about the matter.
(H6) For each statement type, the attributions of objectivity of each partici-
pant group would be negatively associated with the extent to which par-
ticipants thought there was disagreement within their society about the 
statements.
(H7) Within each participant group, an age effect would be observed, where 
individuals in their late teens and twenties would attribute less objectiv-
ity to ethical claims than individuals in younger or older age groups.
In short, we predicted that the major findings of Beebe and Sackris (data not 
shown) would on the whole be replicated in different cultures, thereby reveal-
ing widely shared features of folk metaethical commitments.
3 Moral Objectivism in Cross-Cultural Perspective
The materials that we used were selected from those used by Goodwin and 
Darley (2008) and Beebe and Sackris (data not shown) and are represented in 
Table 1.
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TABLE 1 Factual, ethical and taste claims used in the study by Beebe and Sackris (data not 
shown)
Factual
1. Frequent exercise usually helps people to lose weight.
2. Global warming is due primarily to human activity (for example, the burning of fossil 
fuels).
3. Julius Caesar did not drink wine on his 21st birthday.
4. There is an even number of stars in the universe.
5. Humans evolved from more primitive primate species.
6. Mars is the smallest planet in the solar system.
7. The earth is only 6000 years old.
8. New York City is further north than Los Angeles.
Ethical
9. Anonymously donating a significant portion of one’s income to charity is morally 
good.
10. Assisting in the death of a friend who has a disease for which there is no known cure 
and who is in terrible pain and wants to die is morally permissible.
11. Scientific research on human embryonic stem cells is morally wrong.
12. Before the third month of pregnancy, abortion for any reason is morally permissible.
13. Cutting the American flag into pieces and using it to clean one’s bathroom is morally 
wrong.
14. Lying on behalf of a friend who is accused of murder is morally permissible.
15. Cheating on an exam that you have to pass in order to graduate is morally permissible.
16. Robbing a bank in order to pay for an expensive vacation is morally bad
17. Hitting someone just because you feel like it is wrong.
18. Treating someone poorly on the basis of their race is morally wrong.
Taste
19. Classical music is better than rock music.
20. McDonald’s hamburgers taste better than hamburgers made at home.
21. Brad Pitt is better looking than Drew Carey.
22. Gourmet meals from fancy Italian restaurants taste better than microwavable frozen 
dinners.
23. Beethoven was a better musician than Britney Spears is.
24. Barack Obama is a better public speaker than George W. Bush.
Brad Pitt is an American actor known for his good looks, and Drew Carey is an American 
comedian and television personality who is known for his quirky looks that few would describe as 
handsome.
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Native Chinese, Polish, and Spanish speakers translated these statements into 
their respective languages, and then independent translators translated them 
back into English in order to test for accuracy. Any discrepancies were resolved 
through collaborative discussion. Statements were tailored to make them cul-
turally relevant, when necessary.
Each of the Chinese, Polish, and Spanish statement sets was broken up 
into three different questionnaires. Participants completed the same Tasks 1 
through 3 described above for the each of the statements in their question-
naire. Although Goodwin and Darley (2008) and Beebe and Sackris (data not 
shown) both employed six-point answer scales for their participants to use 
in Tasks 1 and 3, we thought it was preferable to use five-point scales, so that 
participants who had no inclination either to agree or to disagree with a test 
item would have a neutral mid-point to use.
The participants from China were 414 native Chinese speakers (46% 
female) between the ages of 11 and 80 residing in major metropolitan cities in 
the Henan and Shandong provinces. Polish participants were 299 native Polish 
speakers (55% female) between the ages of 19 and 82 living in Wrocław in 
southwestern Poland. In Ecuador, there were 180 native Spanish speakers (59% 
female) between the ages of 18 and 81 living in the capital city of Quito. All par-
ticipants were drawn from large, metropolitan areas. Only in China were there 
any participants under the age of 18.
The proportion of objectivity attributions that participants from China, 
Poland, and Ecuador made to the statements in Table 2 are represented in 
Table 3. The data represented in Table 3 and Figure 2 include all participants, 
including those from China who were under the age of 18. Limiting the data 
only to adults from the three countries had no appreciable effect and so all 
data were included in the subsequent analysis. The statements in both tables 
are organized according to increasing proportions of objectivity attributed to 
them. Like the American participants in Beebe and Sackris’ study, participants 
in all three demographic groups were much more inclined to attribute objec-
tivity to statements about Mars and geographical locations than to statements 
about exercise and unknowable truths from the distant past.
We followed Beebe and Sackris (data not shown) and included a factual 
item whose truth value was not only unknown but practically unknowable 
(claim (2) in Table 2), in order to make a point about the possible limitations 
of our test for objectivity and to suggest directions for future study. We find 
it difficult to believe that anyone could clearheadedly believe that there is 
no fact of the matter about whether Confucius (or Julius Caesar) did or did 
not eat soup on his twenty-first birthday. Yet participants in our study (as in 
Beebe and Sackris’) were rather reluctant to choose the ‘At least one of two 
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TABLE � Factual, ethical and taste claims used in the present study
Factual
  1. Frequent exercise usually helps people to lose weight.
  2. Confucius (or some other ancient cultural figure) did not eat soup on his 21st 
birthday.
  3. New York City (or some other city or country) is further north than Los Angeles 
(another city or country).
  4. Mars is the smallest planet in the solar system.
Ethical
  5. Anonymously donating a significant portion of one’s income to charity is morally 
good.
  6. Assisting in the death of a friend who has a disease for which there is no known 
cure and who is in terrible pain and wants to die is morally permissible.
  7. Lying on behalf of a friend who is accused of murder is morally permissible.
  8. Cheating on an exam that you have to pass in order to graduate (or obtain a job) is 
morally permissible.
  9. Cutting the Chinese (or Polish or Ecuadorian) flag into pieces and using it to 
cleattn one’s bathroom is morally wrong.
10. Treating someone poorly on the basis of their race is morally wrong.
 11. Hitting someone just because you feel like it is wrong.
Taste
12. Mozart was a better musician than Michael Jackson.
13. Traditional Chinese (or Polish or Ecuadorian) music is better than rock music.
14. Meals from an upscale restaurant taste better than food from McDonald’s.
15. The Great Wall of China (or some well-known public figure) is more beautiful than 
the Three Gorges Dam (another public figure).
Each participant group also responded to three additional statements, but these do not appear 
in Table 2 because they were not uniform across the three groups. The full text of the  
questionnaires can be found at (permanent url). With regard to claim No. 15, one concern 
about our research materials stems from the fact that our factual and ethical statements were 
non-comparative, asking participants to consider one object or event at a time, while our taste 
claims were comparative, asking participants to consider pairs of items. Any significant 
difference we obtain between participant assessments of these statement categories could well 
be due to differences of formulation rather than the core features of the statement categories 
themselves. Cova and Pain (2012), however, recently completed a study of the objectivity 
attributions of ordinary participants made to aesthetic statements. Using non-comparative 
statements that included the French predicates ‘beau’ (beautiful) or ‘laid’ (ugly), they obtained 
results equivalent to the ones we report below. Thanks to CK for pressing this point with us.
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disagreeing must be wrong’ answer in regard to this statement. Although we 
could be mistaken, we think it is much more likely that participants are con-
fusing metaphysical and epistemological issues than that they genuinely have 
doubts about the existence of there being a mind-independent fact here. It 
takes a bit of cognitive or philosophical sophistication to recognize that the 
truth value of a statement is one thing, and our knowledge of it is another. 
TABLE 3 Proportions of objectivity attributions to the factual, ethical, and taste claims used in 
the present study, organized by participant group
China Poland Ecuador M
Factual Benefits of exercise 0.38 0.43 0.40 0.40
21st birthday 0.47 0.52 0.47 0.49
Geographical location 0.71 0.74 0.72 0.72
Mars 0.66 0.84 0.73 0.74
Ethical Donating money 0.29 0.27 0.42 0.33
Euthanasia 0.32 0.40 0.65 0.46
Lying 0.53 0.48 0.62 0.54
Cheating 0.59 0.71 0.57 0.62
Flag 0.64 0.58 0.69 0.64
Racism 0.52 0.63 0.77 0.64
Hitting 0.55 0.78 0.68 0.67
Taste Mozart vs. Jackson 0.23 0.19 0.30 0.24
Traditional vs. rock music 0.28 0.14 0.38 0.27
Fine food vs. McDonald’s 0.32 0.19 0.43 0.31
Beauty 0.30 0.26 0.48 0.35
FIGURE � 
Proportions of participant objectivity attributions to factual, 
ethical, and taste claims, organized by participants’ 
demographic group.
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Thus, we believe that at least with regard to this statement, participants were 
responding to something other than what we wanted them to be responding 
to, when they were completing Task 2. While we are more open than some 
philosophers (e.g., Nichols 2004) to the possibility that ordinary individuals 
may well be non-realists or non-objectivists about basic factual matters, we 
think further investigation of folk intuitions about these matters is called for. 
We should note that, despite the fact that we have pointed to a possible limita-
tion of the objectivity test we employed, we agree with Beebe and Sackris (data 
not shown) that it is superior to the other tools that have been employed in this 
area of research (cf., Beebe and Sackris (data not shown) for extended critical 
discussion of other measures that have been used).
Participants in all three of our demographic groups were much more likely 
to view the wrongness of racism and hitting other people as being objec-
tive matters than the goodness of donating to charity or the permissibility 
of euthanasia. Goodwin and Darley (2008, 2012) and Beebe and Sackris (data 
not shown) obtained similar results. The cross-cultural replication of the find-
ing that the goodness of donating money to charity was uniformly viewed as 
being less objective than statements about the wrongness of certain moral 
violations suggests that these results are not due to any accidental differences 
of meaning between the pairs of moral terms ‘good’/‘bad’ and ‘right’/‘wrong.’ 
Rather, the data points toward there being some widely recognized distinction 
between different moral categories, with the actions in some categories viewed 
as weightier or more serious than others.
The average proportion of objectivity attributions to factual, ethical, and 
taste claims within each participant group are represented in Figure 2. Among 
Chinese and Polish participants, significantly more objectivity was attributed 
to factual claims than to ethical claims (Chinese: χ2 (1, N = 1,523) = 5.366, p < 
0.05, Cramér’s V = 0.06 (small effect size). Polish: χ2 (1, N = 1,089) = 6.447, p < 
0.05, Cramér’s V = 0.08 (small effect size)). However, participants from Ecuador 
attributed more objectivity to ethical claims than to factual claims, although 
this difference failed to be statistically significant. Participants in all three 
demographic groups were significantly more inclined to attribute objectivity 
to ethical claims than to taste claims (Chinese: χ2 (1, N = 1,523) = 61.665, p < 
0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.20 (small effect size). Polish: χ2 (1, N = 1,088) = 133.551, 
p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.35 (medium effect size). Ecuadorian: χ2 (1, N = 657) = 
31.329, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.22 (small effect size)).
The differences between the proportions of objectivity attributed to fac-
tual statements by Chinese (0.55), Polish (0.63), and Ecuadorian (0.58) partici-
pants were significant (factual: χ2 (2, N = 1192) = 6.409, p < 0.05, Cramér’s V = 
0.07 (small effect size)). The between-group differences in the proportions of 
objectivity attributed to ethical and taste claims were also significant (ethical: 
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χ2 (2, N = 2,074) = 22.597, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.10 (small effect size); taste: 
χ2 (2, N = 1,194) = 31.739, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.16 (small effect size)).
Looking at each participant group and statement category pair, objectiv-
ity attributions were for the most part positively associated with participants’ 
strength of opinion about an issue, with the largest effects being found for ethi-
cal claims. The association between strength of belief and objectivity attribu-
tions among Chinese participants responding to factual claims: χ2 (2, N = 562) = 
30.163, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.23 (small effect size). Chinese and ethical 
claims: χ2 (2, N = 960) = 115.295, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.35 (medium effect 
size). Chinese and taste claims: χ2 (2, N = 562) = 22.230, p < 0.001, Cramér’s 
V = 0.20 (small effect size). Polish and factual claims: χ2 (2, N = 390) = 32.780, 
p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.29 (small to medium effect size). Polish and ethical 
claims: χ2 (2, N = 695) = 86.759, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.35 (medium effect 
size). Polish and taste claims: χ2 (2, N = 391) = 16.682, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 
0.21 (small effect size). Ecuadorians and factual claims: χ2 (2, N = 236) = 5.917, 
p = 0.052, Cramér’s V = 0.16 (small effect size). Ecuadorians and ethical 
claims: χ2 (2, N = 417) = 23.858, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.24 (small effect size). 
Ecuadorians and taste claims: χ2 (2, N = 240) = 0.049, p = 0.98, Cramér’s V = 0.01. 
In other words, the stronger individuals’ opinions were about a claim, the more 
likely they were to think there was an objective fact of the matter. The only 
exceptions to this pattern concerned Ecuadorians and factual claims, where 
the relationship was marginally significant, and Ecuadorians and taste claims, 
where there was no significant relationship.
Among Chinese and Polish individuals, attributions of objectivity were 
negatively associated with the extent to which they thought there was dis-
agreement within their society about the target statements. The association 
between perceived disagreement and objectivity attributions among Chinese 
participants responding to factual claims: χ2 (4, N = 562) = 52.823, p < 0.001, 
Cramér’s V = 0.31 (medium effect size). Chinese and ethical claims: χ2 (4, N = 
961) = 105.449, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.33 (medium effect size). Chinese and 
taste claims: χ2 (4, N = 562) = 29.782, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.23 (small effect 
size). Polish and factual claims: χ2 (4, N = 393) = 35.128, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 
0.30 (medium effect size). Polish and ethical claims: χ2 (4, N = 696) = 38.372, 
p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.24 (small effect size). Polish and taste claims: χ2 
(4, N = 390) = 25.713, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.26 (small effect size). However, 
there was no such association among Ecuadorian participants. In other words, 
Chinese and Polish participants were less likely to attribute objectivity to state-
ments that they thought were widely disputed and were more likely to attri-
bute objectivity to statements about settled matters.
Strikingly, participants in their late teens and twenties were significantly 
less likely to attribute objectivity to ethical statements in all three participant 
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groups – just as Beebe and Sackris (data not shown) observed in their sample of 
Americans (cf., Figure 3) (Chinese: χ2 (3, N = 955) = 66.052, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 
0.26 (small effect size). Polish: χ2 (2, N = 675) = 14.924, p < 0.01, Cramér’s V = 0.15 
(small effect size). Ecuadorian: χ2 (2, N = 417) = 14.881, p < 0.01, Cramér’s V = 0.19 
(small effect size)).
In none of the demographic groups were there significant differences in how 
participants from different age groups viewed the objectivity of factual claims. 
Chinese and Polish participants aged 17 to 29 were significantly less likely to 
attribute objectivity to taste claims than were other individuals from these 
samples (Chinese: χ2 (3, N = 557) = 30.037, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V = 0.23 (small 
effect size). Polish: χ2 (2, N = 379) = 12.009, p < 0.01, Cramér’s V = 0.18 (small 
effect size)). This result contrasts with Beebe and Sackris’ (data not shown) 
finding that the objectivity attributed by American participants to taste claims 
decreased with age. The only gender-based difference in objectivity attribu-
tions was that females in China attributed less objectivity to ethical claims 
(0.43) than males (0.54) (χ2 (1, N = 961) = 9.819, p < 0.01, Cramér’s V = 0.10, small 
effect size).
Thus, almost every aspect of the hypotheses (H1) through (H7) above was 
confirmed by our study. Participants in China and Poland (but not Ecuador) 
attributed more objectivity to factual claims than ethical claims, and partic-
ipants in all three groups attributed more objectivity to ethical claims than 
taste claims (H1). The average amount of objectivity attributed to ethical 
statements fell significantly below what traditional philosophical theories 
would predict (H2). On the whole, participants in each demographic group 
rarely approached unanimity in their objectivity attributions, displaying con-
siderable intra-cultural variation (H3). Within each participant group, some 
ethical claims were treated as more objective than some factual claims, and 
some taste claims were treated as more objective than some ethical claims 
(H4). Attributions of objectivity were in general positively associated with the 
FIGURE 3 
Proportions of participant objectivity 
attributions to ethical claims, organized 
by participant age and demographic 
group.
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strength of participants’ opinions but negatively associated with the extent to 
which they thought there was societal disagreement about the statements (H5 
and H6). Finally, individuals in their late teens and twenties from all cultures 
attributed less objectivity to ethical claims than individuals in younger or older 
age groups (H7).
4 Discussion
One important lesson from our data is that individuals from at least some dif-
ferent parts of the globe agree in treating moral statements as considerably 
more objective than taste claims. While some philosophers have occasionally 
defended subjectivist visions of morality (e.g., Protagoras, Hume), very few (if 
any) have ever maintained that this is how the ordinary person in the street 
views morality. The norm among moral theorists has been to maintain that 
ordinary individuals view morality as being strongly objective. J.L. Mackie 
(1977, 33), for example, claimed:
The ordinary user of moral language means to say something about what-
ever it is that he characterizes morally, for example a possible action, as it is 
in itself . . . and not about, or even simply expressive of, his, or anyone else’s, 
attitude or relation to it . . . one that is absolute, not contingent upon any desire 
or preference or policy or choice.
Michael Smith (1994, 6, 84) has argued that “we seem to think moral ques-
tions have correct answers; that the correct answers are made correct by 
objective moral facts.” and that “it is a platitude that our moral judgements at 
least purport to be objective”). Indeed, what Smith calls ‘the moral problem’ is 
constituted by the following conjunction of alleged facts that do not sit well 
together: (i) Moral Objectivity: moral judgements are beliefs about matters of 
fact, (ii) Internalism: moral judgements, by themselves, motivate those who 
make them, and (iii) Humean Theory of Motivation: beliefs and desires are 
distinct states; beliefs on their own cannot motivate. Similar claims have been 
made by David Brink (1989) and Stephen Darwall (1998) – and tacitly taken for 
granted by countless others. However, the variation that we observed across 
issues and across individuals (and that Goodwin and Darley 2008 and Beebe 
and Sackris observed as well) suggest that the folk conception of morality is 
not as uniformly and strongly objective as these philosophers have assumed.
Another important lesson from our study concerns the fact that the objec-
tivity attributions of participants in each of our samples and those in Beebe 
and Sackris’ study were affected in the same ways by the same factors. When an 
issue was viewed as being settled or uncontroversial, participants were much 
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more likely to attribute objectivity to a statement about it. But when an issue 
was viewed as being highly contentious or unsettled, participants inclined 
toward non-objectivist responses. Recent experimental manipulations by 
Beebe (2014) and Goodwin and Darley (2012) show that causal conclusions 
can be drawn about the negative association between metaethical objectiv-
ity attributions and perceived societal disagreement. When the extent of dis-
agreement about an issue was made salient and its degree was manipulated, 
objectivity attributions decreased.
Although we observed a significant degree of cross-culturally uniformity in 
our study, we do not wish to draw overly strong conclusions about the univer-
sality of folk metaethical commitments from our data. From the recent history 
of moral psychology, we are aware that the initial evidence seemed to support 
Elliot Turiel’s (1983) claims about the universality of the moral/conventional 
distinction but that later evidence emerged to reveal significant cross-cultural 
diversity (e.g., Shweder, Mahapatra & Miller 1987; Haidt, Koller & Dias 1993). We 
wish to draw the modest conclusion that in regard to the hypotheses laid out 
in (H1) through (H7), there was significant uniformity in our three participant 
populations. We believe that the best way to advance the moral-psychological 
study of folk metaethical commitments is to study them from a non-WEIRD 
perspective (Henrich et al. 2010), and thus we hope that our results will con-
tribute to a better understanding of folk thinking in this domain.
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